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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
v. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW : Case No. 20020137-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for four counts of attempted 
communication fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
sections 76-4-102(3) and 76-10-1801 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), which grants this Court 
jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The State accused Appellant Brooks Bradshaw of offering to secure mortgage 
loans for 11 people in exchange for $400 to $600 each and then providing no services. 
Under the communications fraud statute, amounts sought to be taken between $300 and 
$1,000 constitute a class A misdemeanor while amounts over $5,000 are a second degree 
felony. The State aggregated the entire amount taken from all 11 victims, which 
exceeded $5,000, and charged Mr. Bradshaw with 11 counts of second degree 
communication fraud. Did the State have statutory and constitutional authority to charge 
Mr. Bradshaw with 11 second degree felonies? 
This Court reviews trial courts' interpretations of statutes for correctness. State v. 
Mast 2001 UT App 402, f7, 40 P.3d 1143. Mr. Bradshaw challenged the State's 
charging decision in a motion to quash the bindover and he pleaded guilty contingent on 
his right to raise this issue on appeal. R. 85-92; 157: 7-8; State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct App. 1988).l 
2. In soliciting money to secure mortgages, Mr. Bradshaw acted as an individual, 
did not establish a business entity, and did not form an association-in-fact with others. 
The State charged Mr. Bradshaw with racketeering foi conducting a criminal enterprise 
which consisted solely of Mr. Bradshaw himself. Did Mr. Bradshaw conslitute an 
"enterprise" under Utah's racketeering statute? 
This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of statutory language for 
correctness. Mast 2001 UT App 402, [^7, 40 P.3d 1143. Mr. Bradshaw argued this issue 
in his motion and he reserved the right to raise this issue on appeal when he pleaded 
guilty. R. 93-94; 157: 7-8; Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
!The volume marked 155 contains a transcript of the hearing on the motion to 
quash. Volume 156 includes the trial court's oral decision on the motion. Mr. Bradshaw 
pleaded guilty at a hearing recorded in volume 157. The trial court sentenced Mr. 
Bradshaw at a proceeding contained in volume 158. The internal page numbers of those 
volumes are included after "R." and the volume number. 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Addendum contains the judgment and the following constitutional provisions 
and statutes: 
Addendum A: 
Addendum B: 
Addendum C: 
Addendum D: 
Addendum E: 
Addendum F: 
Addendum G: 
Addendum H: 
Addendum I: 
Addendum J: 
Judgment, January 15, 2002 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999) 
U.S. Const. Amend V 
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII 
Utah Const, art. I, §9 
Utah Const, art. I, §12 
Utah House of Representatives Debates, 
February 11, 1985 
Utah Senate Debates, February 27, 1985 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State accused Mr. Bradshaw of promising to secure mortgages, taking money 
from several people, and then performing no services. R. 1-9. The State filed an 
Information on November 2, 2000, charging Mr. Bradshaw with 11 counts of second 
degree communication fraud and one count of racketeering. R. 1-9. On May 2, 2001, 
trial counsel and the State entered a written stipulation as to the facts of the case to allow 
Mr. Bradshaw to challenge the adequacy of the Information. R. 76. Mr. Bradshaw then 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the trial court bound over Mr. Bradshaw on 
all charges. R. 74 
On May 15, 2001, Mr. Bradshaw filed a motion to quash the bind over based on 
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the stipulated facts. R. 85. The State opposed the motion. R. 96. After conducting a 
hearing on the motion, the trial court upheld the bind over. R. 155; 156. 
On August 28, 2001, Mr. Bradshaw pleaded guilty to four counts of attempted 
communications fraud but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to quash. 
R. 119; 157: 4, 7-8. The trial court accepted Mr. Bradshaw's pleas and dismissed the 
remaining charges. R. 157: 9-10. On January 15, 2001, the trial court sentenced Mr. 
Bradshaw to concurrent terms of up to five years each and ordered him to pay full 
restitution. R. 158: 13. Mr. Bradshaw filed a notice of appeal on February 12, 2002. R 
143. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the stipulated facts, between March and June of 2000, Mr. Bradshaw 
approached several people whose mortgages were being foreclosed. R. 76-81. Mr. 
Bradshaw claimed that he had financial interests in several mortgage companies and that 
he would be able to refinance the mortgages. R. 76-81. To several of these people, he 
represented that he was the co-owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. R. 76-79. 
To at least one person, Mr. Bradshaw claimed that he had an interest in In-Time Funding. 
R. 76. He also informed a married couple that he had sufficient money and connections 
to arrange the purchase of their store. R. 78. Mr. Bradshaw took between $400 and $600 
from these people for a title search, credit check, and/or appraisal fee but provided no 
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services. R. 76-81. 
The stipulation provided further that Brett Kennedy "used to work with [] Mr. 
Bradshaw" and witnessed one of the representations detailed above. R. 82. William 
Thomas also "used to work with Mr. Bradshaw" and observed other representations. R. 
82. Mr. Thomas asserted further that Mr. Bradshaw asked him to falsely represent 
himself as an appraiser to one of the victims. R. 82. Mr. Bradshaw stipulated that the 
owners of Classic Mortgage and In-Time Funding would have testified that Mr. 
Bradshaw falsely represented that he had no financial interest in these companies. R. 83. 
Further according to the stipulation, Mr. Bradshaw had been a state certified 
appraiser but the Department of Commerce's Real Estate Division had revoked his 
license in 1998 because he had a pattern of fraudulently inflating property values. R. 83. 
Finally, Mr. Bradshaw admitted to an investigator for the Attorney General's Office that 
he had promised the victims to refinance their mortgages and that he had taken money 
from them without providing the promised services. R. 83-84. Mr. Bradshaw stated that 
he used the money to pay his personal bills. R. 84. The trial court found this evidence 
sufficient to bind over Mr. Bradshaw for trial on all charges. R. 74. 
Mr. Bradshaw claimed in a motion to quash the bind over that he had not 
committed 11 separate second degree felonies for communications fraud. R. 85. To 
establish a second degree felony under the communications fraud statute, the State must 
show that the defendant sought to obtain property or money in excess of $5,000. Utah 
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Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(d) (1999). In determining the degree of an offense, the statute 
allows the State to aggregate the "total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained" by a scheme or artifice. Id § 76-10-1801(2). Moreover, the 
statute provides that ,f[e]ach separate communication . . . is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud." Icl § 76-10-1801(5). 
The State interpreted this statute as allowing it to total the amount taken from all of 
the victims of a scheme and then charge the aggregated amount for each separate 
communication. R. 1-8, 100. In this case, for example, each communication would 
constitute a class A misdemeanor if charged separately based on the individual amount 
taken from each person. Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-1801(l)(b). R. 88. But, 
aggregating the total taken from all victims raised the amount to over $5,000 which is a 
second degree felony. Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-1801(1 )(d). 
In his motion, Mr. Bradshaw argued that the communications fraud statute only 
allowed the State to either aggregate the total taken and to enhance the crimes as a single 
scheme over $5,000 or to charge him with 11 separate class A misdemeanors. R. 88. Mr. 
Bradshaw contested that the State's interpretation violated several laws, was 
"duplicitous," and unconstitutional. R. 88-91. He asserted further that he did not commit 
the crime of racketeering because he had not engaged in criminal activity with a separate 
"'[enterprise'" as required for that crime. R. 93 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1602(1) (1999)). 
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In opposition, the prosecutor contended that the communications fraud statute 
granted the State discretion to aggregate the total amount taken on each count and that 
Mr. Bradshaw could be both a person and an enterprise under the racketeering statute. R. 
100-02, 107-11. The prosecutor noted that trial court judges have interpreted the 
communications fraud statute "both ways" throughout the State. R. 155: 9. She, 
therefore, "wanted to make a record here and then we can either resolve this case or-or 
take it up on appeal to get a resolution from the appellate courts about whether the way 
we charge it is appropriate." R. 155: 9. 
The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the communications fraud statute 
allowed the State both to aggregate the total amount taken and to enhance each 
communication with the aggregated amount. R. 156: 4. It also found that Mr. Bradshaw 
had operated a racketeering enterprise. R. 156: 7-10. 
Subsequently, Mr. Bradshaw entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of 
attempted communication fraud. R. 119, 157: 4. In doing so, he reserved his right to 
challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to quash. R. 119, 157: 7-8. The trial court 
accepted Mr. Bradshaw's pleas and ultimately sentenced him to four concurrent terms of 
up to five years each and ordered him to pay full restitution. R. 157. 9-10; 158: 13. This 
appeal followed. R. 143. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court and the State misconstrued the communications fraud statute in 
aggregating the total amount sought to be taken and then charging Mr. Bradshaw with 
that amount for each communication. Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative 
history allow the State to aggregate charges in this maimer. To rule other otherwise, 
would exceed the purpose of aggregation provisions of treating offenders of several minor 
thefts the same as offenders of a major theft. Instead, the State's approach unfairly treats 
minor offenders as serial criminals of large-scale crimes. Given the ambiguity in the 
communications fraud statute, the rule of lenity requires this Court to reject the State's 
interpretation and to merely allow prosecutors discretion to charge fraudulent 
communications separately or to file them as a single serious offense. 
The State's approach also implicates the rights to be free from being punished 
multiple times for the same offense and cruel and unusual punishments. Double jeopardy 
limits the State from charging persons multiple times for the same offense to the unit of 
prosecution specified in a statute. Because the communications fraud statute is 
ambiguous, it fails to identify the unit of prosecution. The rule of lenity requires this 
Court to favorably construe the statute to Mr. Bradshaw. The statute also imposes cruel 
and unusual punishment under both the federal and state constitutions. Punishing 
offenders of small crimes the same as offenders of serious crimes is disproportionate, 
excessive, and unreasonable. 
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No other jurisdiction has allowed prosecutors to aggregate the total amount sought 
to be obtained in a scheme and apply that amount to each separate crime. Utah law 
supports this conclusion. Under the single larceny rule, the State cannot aggregate 
multiple acts into a single crime to unfairly increase punishments. Likewise, the rule of 
multiplicity bars the State from falsely portraying defendants as more serious offenders 
than they actually are and seeks to avoid multiple punishments for a single offense. 
Aggregating, multiple times, the amounts taken in this case, violates the policies behind 
these doctrines. 
The State, likewise, failed to establish that Mr. Bradshaw violated racketeering 
laws. Although a person can be an enterprise, that person must either form a business 
entity or associate with others like a business entity. Mr. Bradshaw formed no business, 
including a sole proprietorship. Rather, he operated independent of any entity. He also 
did not operate an association in fact. Admittedly, two men worked with Mr. Bradshaw, 
but, there was not evidence that the group shared a common purpose, were organized in 
any sense, or operated as a continuing unit. Under no theory could Mr. Bradshaw be 
viewed as operating an enterprise. 
The State also failed to establish a factual basis for Mr. Bradshaw engaging in 
racketeering activity. Mr. Bradshaw did not invest or gain an interest in any enterprise. 
Rather, he used the funds he obtained to pay his personal bills. The State also failed to 
show any injury to an enterprise as required under federal law. Based on the State's own 
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theory, the enterprise—which, according to the State, consisted solely of Mr. Bradshaw— 
actually benefitted from the activities. 
ARGUMENT 
L A G G R E G A T I N G EVERY F R A U D U L E N T 
COMMUNICATION WITH THE TOTAL AMOUNT 
SOUGHT TO BE TAKEN EXCEEDS THE TEXT OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE AND 
VIOLATES BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
UTAH LAW 
The State's interpretation of the communications fraud statute lacks support in the 
text of the statute or the legislative history. Rather, because that statute is ambiguous, this 
Court must construe it favorably to Mr. Bradshaw. At most, the statute allows 
prosecutors discretion to aggregate into a single count the total amount sought to be taken 
in a scheme or to charge each communication as separate lesser offenses. Were this 
Court to adopt the State's interpretation, multiple violations of law would result, 
including the deprivation of the fundamental rights to be free from double jeopardy and 
cruel and unusual punishment. It would also violate the policies behind the single larceny 
rule and the rule against multiplicity. The State's approach is so extreme that no other 
jurisdiction has allowed its prosecutors to make similar charging decisions. 
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A. Because the Communications Fraud Statute is 
Ambiguous, this Court Must Construe it in 
Favor of Criminal Defendants 
The text of the communications fraud statute does not indicate the legislature's 
intent in prosecuting fraudulent communications. The legislature failed to clarify 
prosecutors' power in aggregating the amount sought to be taken under the statute. 
Because of this ambiguity, the rule of lenity requires this Court to construe the statute in 
Mr. Bradshaw's favor. 
In construing statutes, appellate courts must "'seek to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.'" State v. Ostler, 
2001 UT 68, ff7, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting Gutierrez v. Medley. 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 
1998)). The first step in this process examines the "plain language" of the statute at issue. 
In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). If the meaning of a statute is plain, this 
Court applies that language. Icl But, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, courts 
seek guidance from other sources such as the legislative history and from other 
jurisdictions. Id; State v. Hutchings. 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The communications fraud statute does not plainly explain prosecutors' authority 
in determining the number and degree of offenses. That statute defines communication 
fraud as "devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud another . . . by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and [] 
communicating] directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
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executing or concealing the scheme or artifice." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). The 
statute then lists various penalties depending on the dollar amounts taken or sought to be 
taken ranging from a class B misdemeanor for under $300 to a second degree felony for 
$5,000 or more. l± § 76-10-1801(l)(a)-(d). 
Subsection two of the communications fraud statute provides that the degree of the 
penalty "shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice." IdL at § 76-10-1801(2). The statute later 
explains that "[e]ach separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice. . . is a separate act and offense of communication fraud." 
Id at §76-10-1801(5). 
The State's attempt to read these two provisions together goes beyond the plain 
language of the communications fraud statute. That statute directs prosecutors to charge 
each communication as a separate offense. It also authorizes the State to aggregate the 
total amount taken or sought to be taken under a scheme. But, it does not direct 
prosecutors to combine these two provisions and to elevate every count charged based on 
the total the amounts taken or sought to be taken from all communications. The State 
reads too much into the statute. 
The prosecutor appeared to concede below that the communications fraud statute 
was ambiguous. She informed the trial court that a split of opinion existed among trial 
judges throughout the State on whether the statute allowed prosecutors to elevate the 
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degree of each and every offense charged by aggregating all communications. R. 155: 9. 
Because the statute has perplexed trial court judges, the State brought the charges in this 
matter as a test case for this Court. R. 155: 9. This division of opinion among judges 
establishes the ambiguity of the communications fraud statute. 
Because the statute is ambiguous, this Court must attempt to determine '"the intent 
of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.'" Ostler. 2001 UT 
68, f7, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting Gutierrez. 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998)). As the 
prosecutor explained below, aggregation statutes, such as at issue here, allow prosecutors 
to treat defendants who defraud several persons of small amounts of money like offenders 
who have taken a higher amount of money. R. 100; State v. Joles. 492 So. 2d 490, 494 
(La. 1986), cert, denied 479 U.S. 1056 (1987). The theory behind such provisions is that 
defendants who take a little money from several people are as culpable as those who take 
a lot of money from one person. Joles, 492 So. 2d at 494. Thus, aggregation provisions 
allow prosecutors to treat a person who takes $50 from ten people the same as a person 
who takes $500 from one person. IdL 
But, allowing the State to treat multiple misdemeanor counts of fraud the same as 
multiple second degree felonies drastically and unjustly broadens this policy. Rather than 
likening several minor thefts with one large one, the State's interpretation of the 
communication fraud statute equates the minor offender of several acts with a major 
offender of multiple large crimes. In this case, for example, the State treats Mr. 
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Bradshaw the same as a person who stole $5,000 from each of 11 different people. Such 
a result is "absurd." Ostler, 2001 UT 68, [^10, 31 P.3d 528. The State's interpretation 
goes far beyond "'the purpose'" of the statute to treat small-time offenders of multiple 
thefts the same as large-scale offenders of single acts. Id at f7 (quoting Gutierrez. 972 
P.2d913, 915). 
Nothing in the language of the communications fraud statute nor anything inherent 
in that crime warrants treating Mr. Bradshaw as a major offender of multiple crimes. 
Communications fraud targets a "scheme or artifice to defraud another . . . by fraudulent" 
communications. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999). That crime targets the act of 
soliciting fraudulent schemes. There is no indication in the text of the statute or in the 
nature of the act of soliciting itself to justify equating several minor fraudulent acts with 
multiple major ones. To conclude otherwise runs contrary to the communications fraud 
statute which explicitly punishes offenders differently depending upon the amount of 
money sought to be taken. 
The legislative history of the communications fraud statute provides no support for 
aggregating each communication with the total amount sought to be taken. The 
legislature enacted the statute in 1985 in response to a void in the prosecution of white 
collar crimes. Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 11, 1985) (House Recording 
No. 4) (statements by Rep. McCackney); Addendum I. Utah prosecutors sought a state 
counterpart to the federal mail and wire fraud acts because Utah had no crime against the 
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mere communicating of a fraud. IdL Thus, federal prosecutors bore the sole burden of 
prosecuting all fraudulent communications that did not result in an actual loss of money 
or property. IdL; Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 27, 1985) (Senate 
Recording No. 129) (statements by U.S. Attorney for Utah Brent Ward); Addendum J. 
The legislature adopted the bill unanimously in both houses. 
None of the legislative debates mention the State's power to aggregate the total 
amount sought to be taken on each communication. The bill's sponsor simply stated that 
the bill was patterned after a federal statute. Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(February 11, 1985) (House Recording No. 4) (statements by Rep. McCackney). But, the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes do not include similar provisions that allow for 
aggregating the total amount sought to be taken and then applying that amount to each 
count charged. 18 U.S. Code Ann. §§ 1341-47. The legislature, apparently, never 
contemplated this type of aggregation. Before this Court authorizes prosecutors to 
impose such harsh penalties under the communications fraud statute, the legislature 
should provide this Court with much clearer guidance than it has. 
Because the text and the history of the communications fraud statute are 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity in criminal cases compels this Court to construe the statute 
favorably to defendants. When a statute is ambiguous about the '"degree of crime, [the 
accused] is entitled to the lesser.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 336 (Utah 1971)). Given the ambiguity in 
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the communications fraud statute, this Court should not allow the State to elevate minor 
offenses into serious felonies. Rather, this Court can reasonably construe the statute as 
allowing prosecutors to choose between charging each communication separately or 
aggregating the amounts sought to be taken in a scheme and charging them as one serious 
offense. State v. Fournier. 617 A.2d 998, 1000 (Me. 1992). 
B. Allowing the State to Charge Fraudulent 
Communications Separately and to Enhance 
Each Charge with the Total Amount Sought to 
be Taken in All Communications Violates the 
Rights to be Free From Being Placed Twice in 
Jeopardy and Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The State's construction of the communications fraud statute also impinges on 
fundamental constitutional rights. Because the communications fraud statute does not 
plainly define separate units of prosecution, Double Jeopardy bars the State from 
charging fraudulent communications separately and then aggregating each charge with 
the entire amount sought from all communications. Moreover, transforming multiple 
misdemeanors into second degree felonies raises serious concerns about imposing cruel 
and unusual punishments. These constitutional rights reject the State's attempts to 
enhance multiple counts for fraudulent communications. 
The ambiguity of the communications fraud statute risks violating defendants' 
right to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Criminal defendants 
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have the \ damental right to be free from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense 
following a \ ttal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction; 
and, (3) multipK ounishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 
711, 717 (1969), S ate v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998). Charging 
defendants with muk )le counts under the same statute implicates the last of these 
protections. State v. Ti ner, 6 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
In determining win her a person has been punished twice for the same offense, 
courts generally follow the s me evidence test announced in Blockburger v. United 
States. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (193 I See State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987). 
Under that test, the State may c \ ict defendants of separate crimes if f'each offense 
requires proof of a fact that the otiu does not." Id This test does not apply, however, 
when the State charges a defendant v h the same offense multiple times because "[t]wo 
convictions for violating the same statin will always be the same in law, but they will 
never be the same in fact." State v. Adel. 65 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1998); see also 
State v. Green. 534 S.E.2d 395, 401 (W.Va 000); Commonwealth v. Rabb. 725 N.E.2d 
1036, 1041 (Mass. 2000) (same holdings). Spt ifically, prosecutors can "distinguish the 
two charges by dividing the evidence supporting v ich charge into distinct elements." 
Add, 965 P.2d at 1074. 
Because the same elements test does not apply o multiple charges of the same 
statute, courts scrutinize offenses to determine the "'unit of prosecution' . . . [] the 
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Legislature intended as the punishable act under the specific criminal statute." Id. 
(quoting Bell v. United States. 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)). Subject to the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment, the legislature can define crimes and punishments. 1(1 But, "double 
jeopardy protects a defendant from being convicted twice under the same statute for 
committing just one unit of the crime." Id "If the Legislature has failed to denote the 
unit of prosecution in a criminal statute . . . the ambiguity should be construed in favor of 
lenity." Id.: see also Rabb. 725 N.E.2d at 1041. 
As explained above, the communications fraud statute is ambiguous. The statute 
does not specify whether the State can aggregate each change with the amount sought to 
be obtained from all communications made as part of a >cheme. Rather, it ambiguously 
states that the penalty "shall be measured by the total /alue of all property, money, or 
things obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice." Id at § 76-10-
1801(2). Whether this provision applies to each count or to the entire scheme is unclear. 
Thus, double jeopardy requires this Court to construe the ambiguity in favor of criminal 
defendants. Add. 965 P.2d 1074. 
The policy behind the unit of prosecution analysis supports this conclusion. That 
approach "is designed in part to avoid overzealous charging by the prosecution." State v. 
Turner. 6 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also Adel 965 P.2d at 1075. 
Treating Mr. Bradshaw the same as an offender who cheated 11 different people out of 
$5,000 each epitomizes overzealousness. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the 
18 
State from piling on charges in this manner. 
The State's interpretation of the communications fraud statute further raises 
concerns for imposing cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII. 
The state counterpart to this protection under the Utah Constitution provides: "Excessive 
bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and 
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. 
Although the analytical framework for the Eighth Amendment appears to be in 
flux, the Utah Supreme Court has summarized the federal constitution as prohibiting 
criminal punishments "if they are excessive or contravene evolving standards of decency 
and human dignity." State v. Herrera. 1999 UT 64, [^46, 993 P.2d 854, cert, denied 528 
U.S. 1049 (1999) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957, 961-64, 1001 (1991) and 
Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). The State's view of the communications 
fraud statute violates these principles. Under its approach, the State could have 
prosecuted Mr. Bradshaw for 11 second degree felonies for seeking to obtain a little over 
$5,000. Had Mr. Bradshaw been convicted on all counts, he faced 11 sentences of one to 
15 years each, for a total possible prison term of 165 years. Even conceding the 
egregiousness of preying on people facing foreclosure, such an extreme sentence would 
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be "excessive or contravene evolving standards of decency and human dignity." Herrera, 
1999 UT 64,1f46, 993 P.2d 854. 
For similar reasons, aggregating each communication with the total sought to be 
taken in a scheme violates Utah's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Utah 
Constitution bars punishments that are "so disproportionate to the offense committed that 
it 'shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men [and women] as to what is right and 
proper under the circumstances.'" Id at [^33 (quoting State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 633 
(Utah 1997)). Punishing Mr. Bradshaw with up to 165 years of imprisonment for taking a 
total of $5,000 from 11 people shocks a prudent person's moral senses. Multiplying the 
charges as the State proposes would equate communications fraud with a life sentence. 
Such punishments are reserved for serious crimes of violence such as murder and rape, 
not the taking of money. The State's attempts to aggregate each fraudulent 
communication with the total amount sought to be taken offends any person of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
C. Construing the Communications Fraud Statute 
as Only Granting the State Discretion to Either 
Charge One Higher Crime or Several Smaller 
Ones is Consistent with Utah Law and the Law 
From Other Jurisdictions 
Other jurisdictions' treatment of similar statutes agree that the State cannot 
aggregate the total amount sought in a scheme and apply it to each count charged. No 
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court appears to have ever allowed the State to aggregate charges in the manner the State 
proposes. Rather, courts have merely granted prosecutors discretion either to file charges 
separately or to aggregate the amounts into a single more serious offense. State v. Joles, 
492 So. 2d 490, 494 (La. 1986) (prosecutor has discretion to file theft charges separately 
or to aggregate them into single higher count); State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998 (Me. 
1992) (construing aggregation clause in theft statute as granting prosecutors discretion to 
charge crimes involving a common scheme separately or in a single count); Goodwin v. 
State, 738 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding defendant guilty of six counts of 
theft but then consolidating them into a single count because they were committed 
pursuant to a common scheme), affd 815 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). No court 
has ruled that prosecutors can do both. 
This approach is consistent with Utah law. In State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 238 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), the State charged the defendant with one count of second degree 
communications fraud for unlawfully cashing 35 to 40 checks amounting to over $5,000. 
Although this Court did not address whether the State could aggregate the total amount 
taken for each of the 35 to 40 check cashings, both this Court and the State assumed that 
the proper charging decision was to aggregate the total into one count only. IdL at 240-41. 
The policies behind the single larceny doctrine rule support construing 
prosecutors' discretion in this manner. That doctrine requires courts to regard separate 
acts as one offense f,'[i]f there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan.'" 
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State v. Kimbel. 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980) (quoting People v. Howes. 222 P.2d 969, 
976 (Cal. 1969)). On the other hand, "several distinct acts of larceny constitute separate 
criminal offenses." State v. Barker. 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). The rationale for 
this doctrine "is to prevent the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act and stems 
from the presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code 
against the imposition of harsher punishment." Id, at 696 (fns. omitted). This approach 
allows the State to prosecute persons "'where there is a common plan . . . for grand theft 
as opposed to several petty thefts.'" State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting People v. Neder 94 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1971)). 
The legislature appears to have enacted the communications fraud statute with 
these policies in mind. That statute proscribes the communicating of a "scheme or artifice 
to defraud another," but, in contrast to the single larceny rule, it specifically allows 
prosecutors to charge "each communication" separately. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1), (5) (1999). The communications fraud statute, thus, allows prosecutors 
discretion to go beyond the common law and to either aggregate into a single count the 
total amount sought to be taken or to charge each communication separately. In contrast, 
allowing the State to both aggregate the total amount from a scheme and apply that 
amount to each communication would violate the basic concerns behind the single 
larceny rule. Specifically, aggregating the total amount on each count unfairly allows for 
"the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act and . . . [ignores] resolv[ing] doubts 
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in the enforcement of the penal code against the imposition of harsher punishment." 
Barker, 624 P.2d at 696 (fns. omitted). 
This Court's decision in Patience supports this conclusion. There, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted forgery for altering three of her employer's 
checks. 944 P.2d at 383. The defendant argued that the single larceny doctrine entitled 
her to plead guilty to a single count of attempted forgery. IdL at 390. This Court 
concluded that the doctrine did not apply to forgery because that crime created a third 
degree felony regardless of how much, if any, money was taken. IdL at 391. Because 
forgery targeted the mere act of signing another's name rather than the amount of money 
taken, this Court concluded that the legislature intended to punish each forgery separately. 
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Unlike forgery, the legislature has decided that the amount of money sought to be 
taken in communications fraud determines the seriousness of the crime. Admittedly, that 
crime targets the communication of a fraud regardless of whether the culprit actually 
receives anything of value. But, like larceny offenses, the penalty depends on the amount 
of property or money sought to be taken. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(l)(a)-(d). 
Because the legislature specifically differentiated between minor and major offenders 
under the communications fraud statute, the policy of the single larceny rule of avoiding 
unnecessarily harsh punishments directly applies. Barker, 624 P.2d at 696. 
The State's approach to the communications fraud statute also implicates the rule 
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of multiplicity. That doctrine is based on the due process concern of"'prohibit[ing] the 
Government from charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent 
multiple punishments for the same act.'" State v. Morrison. 2001 UT 73, 1J24, 31 P.3d 
547 (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied 
517 U.S. 1157 (1996)).2 "Its dangers are that the defendant may be given multiple 
sentences for what [the legislature] considered a single offense, and that prolix recitation 
may falsely suggest to a jury that a defendant has committed not one but several crimes." 
United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Charles Alan 
Wright Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3rd §142 (Supp. 2002). Again, if any 
doubt exists as to the legislature's intent, "the rule of lenity prescribes that doubt will be 
resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.". Duncan, 850 F.2d at 
1108 n.4. 
The State's charging decision here implicates the rule of multiplicity because it 
allowed Mr. Bradshaw to be charged with 11 second degree felonies when his conduct 
constituted misdemeanor offenses or a single second degree felony. The charges also 
"falsely" suggested that Mr. Bradshaw committed 11 second degree felomes of over 
2Trial counsel mistakenly claimed below that the State's charging decision was 
"duplicitous." R. 90. The concepts of duplicity and multiplicity are commonly confused. 
Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3rd § 142 (Supp. 2002). 
In contrast to multiplicity where the State charges a single crime in several counts, 
duplicitous charges occur when the State charges separate offenses in a single count. Id ; 
State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 31L 322 (R.I. 1995). 
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$5,000 each. Id This charging practice offends the spirit, if not the letter of the rule 
against multiplicity. 
Because the State's aggregating of the total amount sought to be taken under the 
communications fraud statute poses so many problems, this Court should construe the 
statute leniently in favor of Mr. Bradshaw. Id, As explained above, the most reasonable 
and logical interpretation would allow the State discretion either to charge each fraudulent 
communications separately or to aggregate the charges into a single count. 
II. THE UNILATERAL ACTS OF A LONE INDIVIDUAL DO 
NOT AMOUNT TO RACKETEERING 
The State similarly misconstrued Utah's anti-racketeering laws in charging Mr. 
Bradshaw with operating an enterprise. The fact that a person engages in a series of acts 
does not transform that person's activities into racketeering. In offering to obtain 
mortgages, Mr. Bradshaw formed no business entity, he did not associate with other 
businesses, and his efforts involved little or no organization or assistance from others. 
Further, Mr. Bradshaw did not use the money he obtained to invest or gain an interest in 
any enterprise; rather, he used the funds to pay his own bills. Anti-racketeering laws 
target business activities, not the acts of lone white collar criminals. 
A. No Enterprise Existed in the Absence of a 
Business Entity or a Group of Persons 
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Associating for the Purpose of Particpating in 
Racketeering Activities, 
The State charged Mr. Bradshaw with engaging in a pattern of criminal activities 
under the first two prongs of Utah's anti-racketeering statute. R. 9. Those provisions 
proscribe investing or gaining an interest in a criminal enterprise: 
1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any 
proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern 
of unlawful activity in which the person has participated as a 
principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that 
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any 
enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(1), (2) (1999). The Utah Code defines an "enterprise" as 
"any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
1602(1) (1999). 
In State v. Hutchings. 950 P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's definition of the showing necessary to sustain a conviction 
for racketeering: 
f,[T]he Government must prove both the existence of an 
"enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." 
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The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of 
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging 
in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on 
the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The former is 
proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or 
informal and by evidence that the various associates function as 
a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the 
requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the 
participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish 
these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof 
of one does not necessarily establish the other. The "enterprise" 
is not the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it is an entity 
separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it 
engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a 
separate element which must be proved by the Government." 
Hutchings. 950 P.2d at 431 f quoting United States v. Turkette. 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) 
(emphasis added)). 
This Court explained that an individual may constitute both a person and an 
enterprise under the first two prongs of the anti-racketeering statute. Id, at 433-35.3 But, 
3Although the State originally charged Mr. Bradshaw under the third prong of the 
anti-racketeering statute as well, it abandoned that theory based on this Court's ruling on 
that prong in Hutchings. R. 9, 111. This Court ruled that an individual could not be both 
a person and an enterprise under the third prong. 950 P.2d at 435-38. That prong bars 
persons from being "employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or 
participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs 
through a pattern of unlawful activity." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3) (1999). 
The United States Supreme Court recently held to the contrary. In Cedric Kushner 
Promotions. Ltd. v. King. 121 S.Ct. 2087, 2091-92 (2001), the Court ruled that a person 
who held sole ownership in a corporation could be both a person and an enterprise under 
the third prong. Nevertheless, the analysis in this brief concluding that Mr. Bradshaw did 
not associate with an enterprise applies with equal force to any reevaluation of the third 
prong of the anti-racketeering statute in light of King. 
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it ruled that a person must either associate with other people or establish a business entity 
to serve as both a person and an enterprise. Id Specifically, the defendant in Hutchings 
established several bank accounts over which he had sole control. Id at 426. He 
maintained an investment advisor business which he called Applied Financial Concepts 
("AFC"). Id at 427. Through AFC, the defendant solicited investment opportunities 
from several physicians and set up various sham investment funds for them. Id He also 
opened checking accounts through the use of several registered and unregistered dbas 
where he deposited the investments. Id The defendant was the sole signatory of these 
accounts. Id 
This Court ruled that because the defendant had operated AFC as a "business," 
AFC "was a sole proprietorship, which falls squarely within the definition of [an] 
enterprise." Id at 434. In contrast, the defendant's establishing of "shell bank accounts" 
did not establish an enterprise because inanimate objects and intangible rights were not 
"'analogous to a legal entity such as a corporation or to an association of individuals.'" 
Id (quoting Guidrv v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
Thus, Hutchings holds that for a person to be an enterprise, that person must 
engage in activities, alone or with others, that are equivalent to a business entity. This 
ruling comports with other jurisdictions that hold that, for a person to be an enterprise, 
that person must either form a business entity or associate with others in a manner that 
operates like a business. State v. Rael 981 P.2d 280, 283-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); 
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Commonwealth v. Fisher. 682 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa. Super. 1996); Majo. e A. Shields, 
Annotation, Criminal Prosecutions Under State RICO Statutes for Engaa ig in Organized 
Criminal Activity, 89 ALR5th 629, 643, 653-55 (2001). An individual conlucting one's 
own affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity does not qualify as an enterprise. 
Fisher, 682 A.2d at 816. 
Mr. Bradshaw never formed a business entity nor did he associate with others in 
ways analogous to a business. Although Mr. Bradshaw represented that he was an owner 
of Classic Mortgage and In-Time Funding, he had no ties to those businesses. Rather, he 
acted unilaterally and independently of those entities. In fact, there was no evidence that 
Mr. Bradshaw had a connection to any entity. 
Similarly, Mr. Bradshaw did not operate "a sole proprietorship." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1602(1). In the first place, he never formed any type of formal business entity, 
including a sole proprietorship. In any event, to qualify as a sole proprietor, the State 
must present "evidence of 'an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and [include] 
evidence that [a sole proprietor] fiinction[s] as a continuing unit.'" Hutchings, 950 P.2d 
at 431 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). Here, there is no evidence of an organization 
operating as a continuing unit. Although the stipulated facts indicate that two men "used 
to work with Mr. Bradshaw" there is no indication of any structure, formal or informal. 
R. 82. The stipulated facts include no information about how Mr. Bradshaw interacted 
with these two men, the capacity in which the men worked, or even when they were 
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employed. The facts do not address whether any organization existed, at all. 
When a person does not establish a business entity, an enterprise may exist if a 
person forms an "association-in-fact enterprise." Hutchings. 950 P.2d at 434. To 
establish an association in fact, the State must a show (1) "'a group of persons associated 
together for a common purpose;" (2) ,uan ongoing organization;'" and, (3) "'a 
[continuous] course of conduct'." Li (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583); see also Rael, 
981 P.2d at 283-84 (listing the three requirements). The State presented no evidence that 
Mr. Bradshaw was engaged in a common purpose with others. The two men who worked 
with Mr. Bradshaw only stated that they witnessed some of Mr. Bradshaw's actions. 
They did not indicate whether they knew that Mr. Bradshaw was defrauding others or 
whether they participated in the fraud themselves. The only indication of any knowledge 
of fraud involved one man's claim that Mr. Bradshaw ask him to falsely represent himself 
as an appraiser to one victim. R. 82. But, the man did not indicate whether he agreed to 
falsely represent himself or participated in any way in the fraudulent scheme. Rather, the 
facts merely show that Mr. Bradshaw conceived of and perpetrated the fraud. 
Without demonstrating a shared plan or intent, the State cannot establish a 
common purpose. In Commonwealth v. Fisher. 682 A.2d 811 (Pa. Super. 1996), for 
example, the defendant advertised the sale of lake-front property. Id at 813-14. His 
associates showed potential clients the property and then asked them to sign a contract 
and pay a down payment. Id at 814. The defendant falsely represented that the property 
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was suitable for building and he promised to secure mortgages for the purchase. Id. 
Although the clients paid for title searches, taxes, document preparation, and other fees, 
the defendant did not secure the title or record the mortgages. Id. 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that just because a criminal was 
"organized" does not mean that a person operated an enterprise. Id at 816. Rather, 
committing "a series of methodical crimes which, in another context, could be construed 
as racketeering activity" did not constitute a racketeering crime. Id, Even though the 
defendant employed associates to show and sell the property, without more evidence, the 
defendant was simply an ordinary white collar criminal and not a racketeer. Id This case 
presents an even stronger case for finding no racketeering activities because it is not clear 
how Mr. Bradshaw used his two associates. 
For similar reasons, the State also failed to meet the second requirement of an 
association in fact-an "'ongoing organization.'" Hutchings 950 P.2d at 431 (quoting 
Turkette. 452 U.S. at 583). Courts have taken various approaches to defining an 
organization. State v. Ball 661 A.2d 25L 259-60 (N.J. 1995). Utah courts have not 
clearly explained what requirements constitute an organization. But, an enterprise must 
have some structure; otherwise, racketeering would occur anytime two people commit a 
crime together. Weinacht v. State. 744 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). In 
harmony with this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court did find an organization between 
a drug supplier and a seller because they had an "ongoing association," "regularly" made 
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transactions, kept "written accounts" of their dealings, and functioned as a '"continuing 
unit.'" State v. McGrath. 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) (quoting United States v. 
Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 773 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert, denied 460 U.S. 1092 (1983)). 
Some jurisdictions have sought to define an organization simply by relying on the 
United States Supreme Court's description in United States v. Turkette that an 
organization may be "formal or informal." 452 U.S. at 583; see Ball 661 A.2d at 259; 
Hutchings. 950 P.2d at 431. Other jurisdictions have required an "'ascertainable 
structure' . . . beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes." United 
States v. Bledsoe. 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.), cert, denied 459 U.S. 1040 (1982) (quoting 
United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d, 1358 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert, denied 450 U.S. 912 
(1981)). Under a broader view, other courts have ruled that a group need not have any 
specific structure but need only include the "division of labor and the separation of 
functions . . . necessar[y] [to] engage in a high degree of planning, cooperation and 
coordination.'" Rael 981 P.2d at 284-85 (quoting Ball, 661 A.2d at 261). 
Under any formulation, no organization existed in this case. The facts merely 
indicate that two persons who "used to work" with Mr. Bradshaw witnessed some of his 
misconduct and that Mr. Bradshaw asked one of them to falsely portray himself as an 
appraiser. R. 82. There is no evidence of any structure, division of labor, roles, decision-
making, or even the amount of involvement by the two men. The State presented no 
evidence upon which to conclude any type of organization existed. 
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Finally, the State failed to establish any "continuity." Rael 981 P.2d at 285. This 
concept requires a showing of "'an organizational pattern or system of authority that 
provides a mechanism for directing the group's affairs on a continuing, rather than ad hoc 
basis.'" Id (quoting United States v. Kragness, 830 P.2d 842, 856 (8th Cir. 1987)). The 
facts below indicate that Mr. Bradshaw offered to secure mortgages for a brief period 
between March and June of 2000 and that two men were present for some of the meetings 
with potential customers. These facts suggest no mechanism for establishing a continuing 
operation. At most, the undertaking was a "c[s]poradic, temporary'" activity. Id at 284 
(quoting States v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 382, 389 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)). Because the 
evidence does not support an association-in-fact, Mr. Bradshaw did not violate the anti-
racketeering statute. Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 434. 
B. Because Mr, Bradshaw Never Invested in or 
Gained an Interest in an Enterprise, No 
Racketeering Activities Occurred 
Mr. Bradshaw also did not violate the racketeering statute because he engaged in 
no racketeering activities. The State alleged that Mr. Bradshaw either invested in an 
enterprise or acquired an interest in an enterprise. R. 9, 111; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1603(1), (2). But, here, the facts merely showed that Mr. Bradshaw used the proceeds 
from his fraudulent activities to pay his personal bills, not to invest or gain any interest in 
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an enterprise. R. 89. 
Moreover, to establish an investment in an enterprise, most federal courts require a 
showing of a specific injury "caused by the investment income into the racketeering 
enterprise, distinct from any injuries caused by the predicate acts of racketeering." 
Vemco. Inc. v. Camardelk 23 F.3d 129. 132(6thCir. 19941 cert, denied 513 U.S. 1017 
(1994) (emphasis in original). The facts do not allege an injury caused to an enterprise. 
To the contrary, the State alleged that Mr. Bradshaw was the enterprise. Under that view, 
the enterprise suffered no injury, and, in fact, actually benefitted from the racketeering 
activities because Mr. Bradshaw paid his personal bills with the funds. The State failed 
state a crime for racketeering. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bradshaw requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
quash the bind over and to order the trial court to dismiss the criminal information. 
Submitted, this /£«day of May, 2002. 
r 
^ > K E N T ^ H A R T 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Bail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendyc 
Prosecutor: CHARLENE BARLOW 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : HEINEMAN, ROBERT K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 4, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: 02-032 Tape Count: 5385-*125 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/2001 Guilty 
2. ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/2001 Guilty 
3. ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/2001 Guilty 
4. ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/2001 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001200833 FS 
Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Date: Januarv 15. 2 002 
Page 1 
Case No: 001200833 
Date: Jan 15, 2002 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
All counts to run concurrent. 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1801 (1999) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the properly, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, 
or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 
but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds 
$5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or 
artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of 
monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by 
the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element 
of the offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person 
of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element 
of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of 
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way 
of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use 
of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, 
computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made 
or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1602 (1999) (in relevant part) 
1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as 
licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct 
which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of 
unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the 
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall 
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either 
to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes 
comprising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred 
after July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part of a 
pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shall have 
occurred within five years of the commission of the next 
preceding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding 
a legal or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, 
and local governmental entities. 
ADDENDUM D 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999) 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds 
derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of 
unlawful activity in which the person has participated as a 
principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that 
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful 
activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest 
in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a 
pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
ADDENDUM E 
United States Constitution Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
ADDENDUM F 
United States Constitution Amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
ADDENDUM G 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §9 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. 
ADDENDUM H 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM I 
House Bill 215 
House Debates 
February 11,1985 
CLERK: House Bill 215, Communications Fraud by Gale F. McCackney be it enacted by the 
Legislature of the state of Utah. 
SPEAKER: Representative McCackney. 
REP. MCCACKNEY: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Representatives, House Bill 215 is a much 
needed statute in the state of Utah to be used by state prosecutors in prosecuting and fighting 
white collar crime. The bill is patterned after a federal statute which has been in effect for many 
years and because Utah has not had an equivalent statute most of the white collar crime in this 
area has been prosecuted in the federal court system. This bill had a good hearing in the 
committee and there were some amendments which I point out to you that are in the book which 
were put in the bill in the committee. The theory of the bill is that a person need not be injured 
before we make it a crime and so it makes a crime the intentional communication of a disceptive 
or fraudulent plan or scheme. The problem that we've had in Utah is that we've relied on a theft 
by deception kind of concept which has required that the crime actually occur by having a person 
rely on deceptive misrepresentations or fraudulent misrepresentations and that injury result and 
also that the prosecutor prove at the time the case is at trial that the person when he was securing 
the money or whatever he was getting as a result of this scheme intended to keep it; and to prove 
intent is a very difficult thing. If a fellow says Well I intended really to make a lot of money on 
it and then pay him back and it just didn't work out that way. So prosecutors have had a difficult 
time in trying to deal with this kind of crime. I think it's a good bill. I would hope that you 
would support it. Would try to answer any questions if you have any. 
SPEAKER: Others to the bill Representatives? Seeing no other light... oh one more... 
Representative Palmer... pass. Representative McCackney? 
REP. MCCACKNEY: I'll waive sum-up and ask for your support on the bill. 
SPEAKER: Representative...I mean Carroll... Is that right? Ok. Voting is now open on House 
Bill 215 as amended. Voting is closed on House Bill 215 as amended. House Bill 215 as 
amended having received 58 affirmative votes and no negative votes passes this House and will 
be transmitted to the Senate for its further action. 
ADDENDUM J 
HB215 
Senate Debates 
February 27,1985 
SPEAKER: Senator Hillyard. 
SEN. HILLYARD: Mr. President, I would move that we resolve it to a committee of the whole 
for two minutes to hear Mr. Brent Ward, the U.S. Attorney, to explain House Bill 215 to us. 
CLERK: HB215, Communications Fraud by Rep. McCackney. 
Mr. WARD: Mr. President, members of the Senate, this bill is recommended by the governor's 
security SWAT task force of which I am a member to help to repair Utah's image as a hotbed of 
securities and criminal fraud. One reason for this reputation is that Utah is at a disadvantage 
compared with other states because state and local prosecutors in Utah do not have all of the 
tools they need. This bill will give state and local prosecutors in Utah the same tools available to 
federal authorities and state and local authorities in other states across the country. It will ? a 
statute similar in fact to the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the United States Department of 
Justice. The language of the bill is based on the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes. These 
statutes have withstood the test of almost 100 years experience. In addition, in the House 
Judiciary Committee, the bill was refined to make doubly sure that no innocent person is 
prosecuted for bad business judgment or mere negligence. The bill passed in the House by a vote 
of 58-0. It is supported by the Utah Attorney General, the US Attorney, the statewide association 
of prosecutors, and other similar organizations. I've had the unfortunate experience of 
interviewing scores of victims of white collar crime in Utah. This bill would help to make sure 
that none of these people, at least have the consolation of knowing that the con artists who 
defrauded them will be brought to justice. And I urge that you support this bill. Thank you very 
much. 
PRESIDENT: Any questions? 
SEN. HILLYARD: Seeing none, I would move to dissolve the committee of the whole. 
PRESIDENT: HB215 shows 26 ayes, no nays, 3 being absent. The bill passes signed by the 
President of the session, refer to the House without further action. 
